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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper builds models of nonlinear dynamics in the aggregate investment and borrower net worth to study the causes and nature of endogenous credit cycles. The basic model has two types of projects: the Good and the Bad. The Good projects rely on the inputs supplied by others who could undertake investment in the future, thereby improving their net worth. The Bad projects are independently profitable so that they do not improve the net worth of other borrowers. Furthermore, they are subject ...
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作者：Cherepanov, Vadim; Feddersen, Timothy; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
摘要：In 1908, the Welsh neurologist and psychoanalyst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by the necessity of providing an explanation. We construct a formal and testable model of rationalization in which a decision maker selects her preferred alternative from among those that she can rationalize.
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作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：If agents are ambiguity-averse and can invest in productive assets, asset prices can robustly exhibit indeterminacy in the markets that open after the productive investment has been launched. For indeterminacy to occur, the aggregate supply of goods must appear in precise configurations, but the investment levels that generate these supplies arise systematically. That indeterminacy arises only at a knife-edge set of aggregate supplies allows for a simple explanation of the volatility of asset ...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Katsoulakis, Markos; Rey-Bellet, Luc
作者单位：Sogang University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Crete
摘要：Spatial evolutionary games model individuals playing a game with their neighbors in a spatial domain and describe the time evolution of the strategy profile of individuals over space. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of strategy revision stochastic processes. These equations generalize the existing ordinary differential equations such as replicator dynamics and provide powerful tools for investigating the problem of equilibrium selection. Deterministic e...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms' interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are excluded from the hiring process.
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of St Andrews; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework overlaps with several existing models that have various interpretations and impose various additional restrictions on behavior. We show that the general class of procedures is characterized by acyclicity of the revealed first-stage separation ...
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作者：Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her specialty). Preferences are heterogeneous and interdependent: each specialist values all attributes, but puts a higher weight on her specialty (partisanship). We study how acceptance standards and members' welfare vary with the amount of conflict ...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Zurich; Northwestern University
摘要：Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper, we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that cannot be delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is conducted within a flexible family of games of regime change, which have been used to model, inter alia, speculative currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. The endogeneity of information originate...
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作者：Ordonez, Guillermo L.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers who have intermediate and good reputations, magnifying otherwise small economic shocks.
