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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Tessone, Claudio J.; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Stockholm University
摘要：We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents' centrality and have an exponentially distributed lifetime. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested split graphs. We completely determine the topological properties of the stochastically stable networks and show that they match features exhibited by real-w...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multisided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient,...
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作者：Asheim, Geir B.; Zuber, Stephane
作者单位：University of Oslo; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious ...
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作者：Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on career concerns in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; McLean, Richard P.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Hawkins, William B.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yeshiva University
摘要：We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between the firm and its employees. The model generates a nontrivial dispersion of firm sizes; when firms' production technologies exhibit decreasing returns to labor, it also generates wage dispersion, even...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University
摘要：As multi-hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already been observed. We show that as the population of hospitals and patients grows, the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully becomes low in almost every large exchange pool (although t...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget balance and nonmanipulability (Green and Laffont 1979). Our approach here is to weaken or abandon nonmanipulability. We search for the rules that are minimally manipulable among all fair and budget-balanced ru...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：Ranking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of experts in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration. This paper introduces a new method, called the handicap-based method, and characterizes it through appealing properties. This method assigns not only scores to the items, but also weights to the experts. Scores and weights form an equilibriu...
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作者：Giraud, Raphael
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII
摘要：This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs, i.e., second order beliefs. A new model, called second order dual expected utility, featuring nonadditive second order beliefs, is introduced, axiomatized, and systematically contrasted with the leading alternative model of this kind, i.e., the second order subjective expected utility model (Klibanoff et al. 2005, Nau 2006, Seo 2009) for which, for the sake of comparison, ...
