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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
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作者：Lobel, Ilan; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new metric of information diffusion in social learning that is weaker than the traditional aggregation metric. We show that if a minimal connectivity condition holds and neighborhoods are independent, inform...
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作者：Casajus, Andre
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member's reward after redistribution does not decrease.
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作者：Baetz, Oliver
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (activity). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases (strictly) concavely in the total activity of their neighbors in the network. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we endogenize netwo...
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作者：Nirei, Makoto
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This study demonstrates that the interactions of firm-level indivisible investments give rise to aggregate fluctuations without aggregate exogenous shocks. When investments are indivisible, aggregate capital is determined by the number of firms that invest. I develop a method to derive the closed-form distribution of the number of investing firms when each firm's initial capital level varies stochastically. This method shows that idiosyncratic shocks may lead to nonvanishing aggregate fluctuat...
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作者：Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministichence, akin to classic third degree price discriminationindependently of nonevidence characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence is hierarchical. Wh...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible, then public information can only be replicated if the network...
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作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：It is well known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We ...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the ...
