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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Miami; Columbia University
摘要：We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of past negotiations leads to lower prices and faster trading. Unobservability, therefore, enhances the Coasian effect by fostering efficiency and diverting more of the surplus to the player who possesses pri...
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作者：Kesten, Onur; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
摘要：We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a school-choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be stable based solely on the probabilities that each student will be assigned to different schools, i.e., the assignment must be viewed as stable even before students know which school they will end up going to. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature, which has instead focused on ex post stability, meaning...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cutoff belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect...
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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) and of a randomized strategy equilibrium in distributional form (RSED). We offer a resolution of two longstanding open problems and show that (i) any MSE induces a RSED and any RSED can be lifted to a MSE, and (ii) a mixed strategy profile is ...
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作者：Peski, Marcin; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta 1995, Fudenberg and ...
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作者：Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We show that the class of preferences satisfying the gross substitutes condition of [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] is strictly larger than the class of endowed assignment valuations of [Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005], thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result implies that not every substitutable valuation function can be decomposed into a combination of unit-demand valuations.
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作者：Ergin, Haluk; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Duke University
摘要：We study preferences for timing of resolution of objective uncertainty in a menu-choice model with two stages of information arrival. We characterize a general class of utility representations called hidden action representations, which interpret an intrinsic preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty as if an unobservable action is taken between the resolution of the two periods of information arrival. These representations permit a richer class of preferences for timing than was poss...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.
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作者：Bouton, Laurent; Gratton, Gabriele
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters' behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there ...
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作者：Riedel, Frank; Hellmann, Tobias
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Foster and Hart propose a measure of riskiness for discrete random variables. Their defining equation has no solution for many common continuous distributions. We show how to extend consistently the definition of riskiness to continuous random variables. For many continuous random variables, the risk measure is equal to the worst-case risk measure, i.e., the maximal possible loss incurred by that gamble. For many discrete gambles with a large number of values, the Foster-Hart riskiness is clos...
