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作者：Fuchs, William; Ory, Aniko; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and interdependent values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. With two opportunities to trade, all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions, we show Pareto dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a fai...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers. A first result gives a general necessary condition for a social choice rule to be implementable. The condition combines an inequality version of the standard envelope characterization of payoffs in quasilinear environments with an approach for relating agents' maxmin expected utilities to their objective expected utilities under any common prior. The condition is then applied to give an exact characterizati...
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作者：Frick, Mira
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Motivated by the literature on choice overload, we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a monotone threshold representation: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function v, from which the agent's choices depart in a menu-dependent manner. The severity of the departure is quantified by a threshold map , which is monotone with respect to set inclusion. We derive an axiomatic characterization of the model, extending famili...
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作者：Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Northwestern University
摘要：We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and inputs. At the optimum, the costs of procuring agents-inputs are compensated by the gains from agents-consumers. We show how such cross-subsidization can be achieved through matching rules that have a si...
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作者：Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the formation of joint ventures. We present a novel solution concept to the problem, termed the multicore, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a decomposition o...
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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios; Herrenbrueck, Lucas; Salyer, Kevin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Simon Fraser University
摘要：A consistent empirical feature of bond yields is that term premia are, on average, positive. The majority of theoretical explanations for this observation have viewed the term premia through the lens of the consumption based capital asset pricing model. In contrast, we harken to an older empirical literature that attributes the term premium to the idea that short maturity bonds are inherently more liquid. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical justification of this concept. To that...
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Lorenz, Jan; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Zurich; Constructor University
摘要：We develop a tractable dynamic model of productivity growth and technology spillovers that is consistent with the emergence of real world empirical productivity distributions. Firms can improve productivity by engaging in in-house research and developmenmt (R&D) or, alternatively, by trying to imitate other firms' technologies, subject to the limits of their absorptive capacities. The outcome of both strategies is stochastic. The choice between in-house R&D and imitation is endogenous, and is ...
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This paper analyzes the formation of networks in which each agent is assumed to possess some information of value to the other agents in the network. Agents derive payoff from having access to the information of others through communication or spillovers via the links between them. Linking decisions are based on network-dependent marginal payoff and a network-independent noise capturing exogenous idiosyncratic effects. Moreover, agents have a limited observation radius when deciding to whom to...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to 1 as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averseexhibit Ellsberg-type behavioras modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate ...
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作者：Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty impossible or does not distort its costs at all. In the latter case, the principal will optimally commit to rewarding later successes even tho...
