Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuchs, William; Ory, Aniko; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2237
• 发表日期: 2016-09-01
• 页码: 1103-1144
• 关键词: Adverse selection; TRANSPARENCY; distress; market design; volume

摘要

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and interdependent values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. With two opportunities to trade, all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions, we show Pareto dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a failure to trade by the deadline results in an efficiency loss, public offers can induce a market breakdown before the deadline, while trade never stops with private offers.