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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：As in Gilboa et al. (2010), we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: greater than or similar to* and greater than or similar to<^>. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure. The second binary relation is an uncertainty averse preference, as defined by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011c). It models the rankings that the decision maker expresses if he has to make a choice. We assume that greater than or si...
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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Lien, Yuanchuan
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render the auction vulnerable to defections, as the seller can attract better offers afterward. To avoid instabilities of this type...
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作者：Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then cl...
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作者：Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty impossible or does not distort its costs at all. In the latter case, the principal will optimally commit to rewarding later successes even tho...
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作者：Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：A choice function is list rational(izable) if there is a fixed list such that for each choice set, successive comparison of the alternatives by following the list retrieves the chosen alternative. We extend the formulation of list rationality to stochastic choice setup. We say two alternatives are related if the stochastic path independence condition is violated between these alternatives. We show that a random choice function is list rational if and only if this relation is acyclic. Our chara...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Maastricht University
摘要：We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. Our analysis focuses on behavior in the small noise double limit: we first take the noise level in agents' decisions to zero, and then take the population size to infinity. We show that in this double limit, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal cont...
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作者：Bernard, Benjamin; Frei, Christoph
作者单位：University of Alberta
摘要：We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behavior and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：New York University; University of Lausanne
摘要：This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can privately assess the contribution of an agent to the welfare of a broader group. In the absence of formal contingent contracts, the principal chooses ex post transfers that maximize her social preferenc...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan Sebastian
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
摘要：We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and...
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作者：Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo
摘要：We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
