The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernard, Benjamin; Frei, Christoph
• 署名单位: University of Alberta
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1687
• 发表日期: 2016-05-01
• 页码: 411-453
• 关键词: Folk theorem; repeated games; continuous time; imperfect observability

摘要

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behavior and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.