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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Chernozhukov, Victor; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first show that these results are fragile when individuals are uncertain about the signal distributions: given any such model, vanishingly small individual uncertainty about the signal distributions can lead to substantial (nonvanishing...
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作者：Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Wake Forest University
摘要：I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use in models incorporating budget-constrained bidders. Other implications of the model are that a general revenue equivalence result applies an...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (males and females) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits nontransferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched co...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other-regarding preferences. Our results are relevant for equit...
