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作者：Cooke, Kevin
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I provide axiomatic foundations for a model of taste uncertainty with endogenous learning through consumption. In this setting, uncertainty is over an unobservable, subjective state space. Preference over lottery-menu pairs is sufficient to identify the state space and the learning process. In this model, the agent is viewed as if he learns the utility of an object upon its consumption. This information is used to improve choice from the follow-on menu. This implies a trade-off between consump...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed; Sultanum, Bruno
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as a theory of bank runs driven by self-fulfilling prophecies. Their contribution may alternatively be interpreted as a theory for preventing these bank runs. Absent aggregate risk over liquidity demand, they show that a simple scheme that suspends withdrawls when a target level of bank reserves is reached implements the efficient allocation as the unique equilibrium. Uniqueness implies that there cannot be a bank-run equilibrium. Un...
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作者：Momi, Takeshi
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Warwick; Ashoka University; Brown University
摘要：In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional moves in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually s...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Romanyuk, Gleb; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example wit...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Stanford University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Ou...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossib...
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作者：Hefti, Andreas
作者单位：University of Zurich; Zurich University of Applied Sciences
摘要：This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the strategies. The approach is particularly helpful in applications because (i) it allows the complexity of th...
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作者：Barron, Daniel
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is privately known and evolves according to a Markov process. Under certain assumptions, patient players can attain approximately efficient payoffs in equilibrium. The public signal must satisfy a pairwise full rank condition that is somewhat stronger than the monitoring condition required in the folk theorem proved by Fudenberg et al. (1994). Under stronger assumptions, the efficienc...
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作者：Luz, Vitor Farinha
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) ...
