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作者：Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco; Van Long, Ngo; Poschke, Markus
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：There is growing interest in multisector models that combine aggregate balanced growth, consistent with the well known Kaldor facts, with systematic changes in the sectoral allocation of resources, consistent with the Kuznets facts. Although variations in the income elasticity of demand across goods play an important role in initial approaches, recent models stress the role of supply-side factors in this process of structural change, in particular sector-specific technical change and sectoral ...
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Polemarchakis, Herakles; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions and default carries only a ban from ever borrowing in financial markets even in the presence of uninsurable risks and time-varying interest rate. This extension of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) requires that the present value of the endowment be finite under the most optimistic valuation. We provide examples where this condition fails and sovereign debt is sustained by the threat of loss of insurance...
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作者：Buturak, Gokhan; Evren, Ozgur
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; New Economic School
摘要：We propose a model of choice overload, which refers to a stronger tendency to select the default option in larger choice problems. Our main finding is a behavioral characterization of an asymmetric regret representation that depicts a decision maker who does not consider the possibility of experiencing regret for choosing the default option. By contrast, the value of ordinary alternatives is subject to regret. The calculus of regret for ordinary alternatives is identical to that in Sarver's (2...
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作者：Hiller, Timo
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：I propose a simple model of signed network formation, where agents make friends to extract payoffs from weaker enemies. The model thereby accounts for the interplay between friendship and alliance on one hand and enmity and antagonism on the other. Nash equilibrium configurations are such that either everyone is friends with everyone or agents can be partitioned into different sets, where agents within the same set are friends and agents in different sets are enemies. Any strong Nash equilibri...
