Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito; Yamashita, Takuro
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2275
• 发表日期: 2017-09-01
• 页码: 1393-1438
• 关键词: Double auction; interdependent values; multi-unit demand and supply; ex post incentive compatibility; asymptotic efficiency

摘要

We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.