Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Momi, Takeshi
• 署名单位: Doshisha University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1792
• 发表日期: 2017-09-01
• 页码: 1267-1306
• 关键词: Social choice; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; exchange economy

摘要

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.