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作者：Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Edinburgh; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Toronto
摘要：In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that, by using an asking price, sellers both maximize their revenue and implement the efficient...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our co...
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作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substa...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossib...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991). We construct a canonical peak-only rule that equalizes, in the leximin sen...
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作者：De Oliveira, Henrique; Denti, Tommaso; Mihm, Maximilian; Ozbek, Kemal
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of St Andrews
摘要：We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifying information costs from behavior is especially relevant when these costs depend on factors-such as time, effort, and cognitive resources-that are difficult to observe directly, as in models of rational inattention. Using willingness-to-pay data for opportunity sets-which require more or less information to make choices-we establish a set of canonical properties that are necessary and sufficient...
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作者：Hefti, Andreas
作者单位：University of Zurich; Zurich University of Applied Sciences
摘要：This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows the investigation of, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the strategies. The approach is particularly helpful in applications because (i) it allows the complexity of th...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what groups. Our main axiom requires that membership to each group, say the group of J's, should depend only on the opinions on who is a J and who is not (that is, independently of the opinions on who is a ...
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作者：Barron, Daniel
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is privately known and evolves according to a Markov process. Under certain assumptions, patient players can attain approximately efficient payoffs in equilibrium. The public signal must satisfy a pairwise full rank condition that is somewhat stronger than the monitoring condition required in the folk theorem proved by Fudenberg et al. (1994). Under stronger assumptions, the efficienc...
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作者：Daley, Brendan; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing first on prisoners' dilemma games. A representation theorem establishes these axioms as the precise behavioral content of the model, and that the model's parameters are (essentially) uniquely identified...
