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作者：Tsoy, Anton
摘要：In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation approaches perfect. I characterize the Pareto frontier of the double limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash bargaining split. I then construct a double ...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper studies stationaryMarkov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbit...
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作者：Chavas, Jean-Paul; Menon, Martina; Pagani, Elisa; Perali, Federico
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Verona
摘要：We investigate the relationship between the individual and household indirect utility functions in the context of a collective household model. Our analysis produces new results that explain howthe rule governing the distribution of resources among household members is related to the measurement of household welfare and intra-household inequality. We show that in a collective model of private consumption, income shares are equal to the product of two weights: the Pareto weight and a distributi...
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作者：Kikuchi, Tomoo; Nishimura, Kazuo; Stachurski, John
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Kobe University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper builds coordination costs, transaction costs, and other aspects of the theory of the firm into a production chain model with an infinite number of ex ante identical producers. The equilibrium determines prices, allocations of productive tasks across firms, firmsizes, and the number of active firms. These prices and allocations match several stylized facts on firm boundaries, vertical integration, and division of the value chain.
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constrain...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Haifa; University of Haifa
摘要：We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an individual is deemed more accomplished than another if and only if she has achieved more benchmarks, or important accomplishments. We show that benchmark rules are characterized by four axioms: transitivi...
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作者：Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro-Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation-biased CB's private information on both these dimensions. We find that greater CB competence-more private information-about policy objectives is desirable while greater competence about operational shocks need not be. When the CB has less private ...
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作者：Nishimura, Hiroki
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：In this paper, we study methods of inferring a decision maker's true preference relation when observed choice data reveal a nontransitive preference relation due to choice mistakes. We propose some sensible properties of such methods and show that these properties characterize a unique rule of inference, called the transitive core. This rule is applied to a variety of nontransitive preference models, such as semiorders on the commodity space, relative discounting time preferences, justifiable ...
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作者：Azar, Pablo D.; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucial in our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x = (x(1), ..., x(n)), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x is costly, but computing the output f(x) has zero cost once x is known. We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to delegate the evaluation of f to an agent whose cost of learning any ...
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作者：Liu, Heng
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classica...
