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作者：Plantin, Guillaume; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：When do flexible exchange rates prevent monetary and financial conditions from spilling over across currencies? We examine a model in which international investors strategically supply capital to a small inflation-targeting economy with flexible exchange rates. For some combination of parameters, the unique equilibrium exhibits the observed empirical feature of prolonged episodes of capital inflows and appreciation of the domestic currency, followed by reversals where capital outflows go hand-...
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作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Decancq, Koen; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; KU Leuven
摘要：We provide an axiomatic justification to aggregate money metrics. The key axiom requires the approval of richer-to-poorer transfers that preserve the overall efficiency of the distribution. This transfer principle-together with the basic axioms of anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and a version of welfarism-characterizes a standard social welfare function defined over money metric utilities.
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton
摘要：An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I pr...
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作者：Phuong Le
作者单位：Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with singleminded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG), that is individually rational, incentive compatible, and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG works by first truncating valuations at budgets, and then implementing standar...
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作者：Ke, Shaowei
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We characterize axiomatically a stochastic choice model, the consistent-mistakes model (CMM), that describes an error-prone decision maker's choices. In contrast to random utility models, CMMs generate closed-form choice probability. Under the axioms, we uniquely identify from the choices an expected utility function that represents the decision maker's true preference and a propensity function that describes how likely an alternative is to be chosen. We introduce a measure of error-proneness ...
