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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：We study a multidimensional collective decision under incomplete information. Agents have Euclidean preferences and vote by simple majority on each issue (dimension), yielding the coordinate-wise median. Judicious rotations of the orthogonal axes-the issues that are voted upon-lead to welfare improvements. If the agents' types are drawn from a distribution with independent marginals, then under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals are identical (but n...
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作者：Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent's payoff depends both on the state and on the actions of others. Agents want both to learn the state and to anticipate others' play. As the sample of previous actions provides information on both dimensions, standard informational externalit...
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作者：Cripps, Martin W.; Thomas, Caroline D.
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server that processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either a geometric random variable in the good state or zero in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if the agents are served or choose to quit the queue. Agents can observe only the evolution of the queue aft...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We propose two novel axioms for qualitative probability spaces: (i) unlikely atoms, which requires that there is an event containing no atoms that is at least as likely as its complement; and (ii) third-order atom-swarming, which requires that for each atom, there is a countable pairwise-disjoint collection of less-likely events that can be partitioned into three groups, each with union at least as likely as the given atom. We prove that under monotone continuity, each of these axioms is suffi...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of epsilon-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (epsilon-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of epsilon depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside ...
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of Padua; University of Manchester
摘要：We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model m...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi-linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable statements is sufficiently rich, we show that there is an ex ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, the allocatio...
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作者：Perez-Nievas, Mikel; Conde-Ruiz, Jose I.; Gimenez, Eduardo L.
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Complutense University of Madrid; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：This paper explores the properties of the notions of A-efficiency and P-efficiency, which were proposed by Golosov et al. (2007), to evaluate allocations in a general overlapping generations setting in which fertility choices are endogenously selected from a continuum and any two agents of the same generation are identical. First, we show that the properties of A-efficient allocations vary depending on the criterion used to identify potential agents. If one identifies potential agents by their...
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作者：Massari, Filippo
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor lucky traders with incorrect beliefs over skilled traders with accurate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and it sho...
