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作者：Noda, Shunya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and f...
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作者：Foerster, Manuel
作者单位：University of Hamburg
摘要：We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic equilibria. Second, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a fully informative farsighted (perfect Bayesian) equili...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno; Lefort, Jean-Philippe
作者单位：Insper; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We characterize prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Bewley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility, respectively, with a common set of priors and the same utility over consequences. We use this setup with two preference relations to develop a novel rationale for full Bayesian updating of maxmin expected utility...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implicatio...
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作者：Tierney, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We identify a large subdomain, ?, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of ?, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set ? consists of all economies in which competitive equilibrium would prescribe that all agents consume a positive quantity of money. Since we study quasilinear preferences, this is the domain of primary interest. Our locally non-manipulable r...
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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Nava, Francesco
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reaches agreement, they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask under which conditions such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficienciesmismatch and delayfeature freque...
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作者：Galperti, Simone
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about intratemporal trade-offs between goods. It explains the subtle mechanism that renders budgets useful commitments, their intera...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE
摘要：We study a discriminatory limit-order book in which market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to serve a privately informed insider. Our model allows for general nonparametric specifications of preferences and arbitrary discrete distributions for the insider's private information. Adverse selection severely restricts equilibrium outcomes: in any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs, pricing must be linear and at most one type can trade, leading to an extreme form of market breakdown....
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin
摘要：Increasingly, more school districts across the United States are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that, in general, participation by all schools may not be achievable because schools have incentives to stay out. This may explain why s...
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作者：Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects that require higher pay-performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chos...
