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作者：Li, Anqi; Yang, Ming
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Duke University
摘要：Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the designer's strategic planning. In otherwise standard principal-agent models with moral hazard, we allow the principal to partition agents' performance data into any finite categories, and to pay for the amoun...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Stanford University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisyprivatesignals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, playerscommonlylearn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.
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作者：Cetemen, Doruk; Hwang, Ilwoo; Kaya, Ayca
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Miami
摘要：We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the project's prospects. We study the extent to which this incentive counters the usual free-riding incentive. Restricting the agents' access to feedback can increase their equilibrium effort levels by mitigati...
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作者：Forand, Jean Guillaume; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：University of Waterloo; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We characterize optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is nontransferable, and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. To demand the production of projects that benefit her but not the agent, the principal must commit to produce projects that benefit the agent in the future. Production at all stages of the relationship is ordered by projects'cost-effectiveness, ...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem, the ranking is represented by the same risk index as in the case of constant absolute risk aversion utility agents and normally distributed risky assets.
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作者：Li, Jian
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：We commonly think of information as an instrument for better decisions, yet evidence suggests that people often decline free information in nonstrategic scenarios. This paper provides a theory for how a dynamically-consistent decision maker can be averse to partial information as a consequence of ambiguity aversion. It introduces a class of recursive preferences on an extended choice domain, which allows the preferences to depend on how information is dynamically revealed and to depart from th...
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作者：Erlanson, Albin; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Essex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent's claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule,...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to acurse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome...
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作者：Kovach, Matthew
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：Considerable evidence shows that people have optimistic beliefs about future outcomes. I present an axiomatic model of wishful thinking (WT), in which an endowed alternative, or status quo, influences the agent's beliefs over states and thus induces such optimism. I introduce a behavioral axiom formalizing WT and derive a representation in which the agent overweights states in which the endowment provides a higher payoff. WT is a novel channel through which an endowment may influence choice be...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information that could potentially lead to belief updating as a response to the incentives provided by the mechanism itself, and (b) to report his beliefs truthfully. Such mechanisms are calledrobust scoring rules...
