Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3820
• 发表日期: 2020-07-01
• 页码: 1175-1219
• 关键词: Repeated game; private monitoring; incomplete information; ex post equilibrium; individual learning; C72; C73

摘要

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisyprivatesignals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, playerscommonlylearn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.