Uncertainty-driven cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cetemen, Doruk; Hwang, Ilwoo; Kaya, Ayca
• 署名单位: Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Miami
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3616
• 发表日期: 2020-07-01
• 页码: 1023-1058
• 关键词: Team production; free-riding; uncertainty; learning; C72; C73; D23; D83

摘要

We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the project's prospects. We study the extent to which this incentive counters the usual free-riding incentive. Restricting the agents' access to feedback can increase their equilibrium effort levels by mitigating the ratchet effect. In this case, using joint performance measures can be beneficial even when individual measures are available.