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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.; Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into types, and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective, then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convex...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equ...
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作者：Lu, Jay
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We introduce a model of random ambiguity aversion. Choice is stochastic due to unobserved shocks to both information and ambiguity aversion. This is modeled as a random set of beliefs in the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We characterize the model and show that the distribution of ambiguity aversion can be uniquely identified from binary choices. A novel stochastic order on random sets is introduced that characterizes greater uncertainty aversion under stochasti...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We consider a platform that provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform'...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents, but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff and construct equilibria that attain this payoff. Since the patient player's Stackelberg action is mixed and motivating the lowest-benefit type to play mixed actions is costly, every type's ...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Robson, Arthur
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：Our understanding of risk preferences can be sharpened by considering their evolutionary basis. The existing literature has focused on two sources of risk: idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk. We introduce a new source of risk-heritable risk-in which there is a positive correlation between the fitness of a newborn agent and the fitness of her parent. Heritable risk was plausibly common in our evolutionary past and it leads to a strictly higher growth rate than the other sources of risk. We s...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Fershtman, Daniel; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University; Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of qualification and chooses whether to apply for the task. The principal wishes to appoint the most qualified agent and chooses which agent to assign as a function of the public history of profits. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium and identify a simple strategy...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide an equilibrium framework for modeling the behavior of an agent who holds a simplified view of a dynamic optimization problem. The agent faces a Markov decision process, where a transition probability function determines the evolution of a state variable as a function of the previous state and the agent's action. The agent is uncertain about the true transition function and has a prior over a set of possible transition functions; this set reflects the agent's (possibly simplified) vi...
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作者：Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Xiamen University; University Diego Portales
摘要：Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning gives ri...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic revealed-preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to an array of theories, illustrating its versatility. We identify theories and data sets testable in the same elegant way as rationality, and theories and data sets where testing is more challenging. We sho...
