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作者：Bloise, G.; Polemarchakis, H.; Vailakis, Y.
作者单位：Yeshiva University; Roma Tre University; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the economy, self-insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the implicit threat of loss of the risk-sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates a...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predicti...
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作者：Kumar, Ujjwal; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are neighbors. A social choice function is locally strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is a neighbor of her true type. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresenta...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi
摘要：We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most temp...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Danieli, Alexander; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：New York University; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Arizona
摘要：The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R(m-1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m-best response sequence (m-BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive-for...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be decorrelated to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Bristol; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number of blocking pairs. Our main result characterizes the priority profiles for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA assignme...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to monitor each other by making the transfers contingent on the entire vector of reports. We characterize the least costly contract that implements any given vector ...
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作者：Schlag, Karl H.; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of St Andrews
摘要：We study sequential search without priors. Our interest lies in decision rules that are close to being optimal under each prior and after each history. We call these rules robust. The search literature employs optimal rules based on cutoff strategies, and these rules are not robust. We derive robust rules and show that their performance exceeds 1/2 of the optimum against binary independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) environments and 1/4 of the optimum against all i.i.d. environments....
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Eliaz, Kfir; Mu, Xiaosheng
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Princeton University
摘要：Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public discussions on whether individuals' privacy should be better protected by restricting the amount or the precision of information that is collected by commercial institutions on their participants. We contribute to this discussion by proposing a Bayesian approach to measure loss of privacy in a mechanism. Specifically, we define th...
