作者：Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative to conventional mechanisms. We analyze this limited commitment environment as a standard mechanism design problem with an additional credibility constraint, requiring that every outcome be interim-optim...
作者：Kostadinov, Rumen
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：I study a repeated principal-agent game with long-term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation contracts are designed to punish deviations in noncontractible behavior. If the equilibrium actions are observed, these contra...
