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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Holzman, Ron; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Glasgow
摘要：A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it?In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n >= p, the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n < p, combining (varian...
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Amazon.com
摘要：How does the increasing publicness of decisions (due, e.g., to social media) affect the total costs of social signaling distortions? While pervasive signaling may induce pervasive distortions, it may also permit people to signal while distorting each choice to a smaller degree. Ironically, for a broad class of environments, a sufficient increase in the number of signaling opportunities allows senders to live authentically, that is, to signal their types at arbitrarily low overall cost. This re...
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作者：Sadakane, Hitoshi
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the message. As in the canonical cheap-talk model, all the equilibria are interval partitional; in our setting, however, the set of equilibrium partitions becomes larger. We show that the multistage information...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Fan; Hsu, Wen-Tai; Peng, Shin-Kun
作者单位：National University Kaohsiung; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Power laws in productivity and firm size are well documented empirical regularities. As they are upper right-tail phenomena, this paper shows that assuming asymptotic power functions for various model primitives (such as demand and firm heterogeneity) are sufficient for matching these regularities. This greatly relaxes the functional-form restrictions in economic modeling and can be beneficial in certain contexts. We demonstrate this in a modified Melitz (2003) model, which embeds an innovatio...
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作者：Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper characterizes those preferences over bounded infinite utility streams that satisfy the time value of money principle and an additivity property, and the subset of these preferences that, in addition, are either impatient or patient. Based on this characterization, the paper introduces a concept of optimization that is robust to a small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov decision process admits...
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作者：Escude, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a sender provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel viscosity dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relati...
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作者：Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：This paper shows that in some axioms regarding the mixture of random variables, the requirement that the conclusions hold for all values of the mixture parameter can be weakened by requiring the existence of only one nontrivial value of the parameter, which need not be fixed. This is the case for the independence, betweenness, and mixture symmetry axioms. Unlike the standard axioms, these weaker versions cannot be refuted by experimental methods.
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：In this paper, we study the conditions under which termination is a useful incentive device in the canonical dynamic principal-agent moral hazard model of Sannikov (2008). We find that temporary suspension of the agent after poor performance dominates termination if the principal's outside option is low and the agent's outside option is moderate. In suspension, the agent performs tasks free of moral hazard and receives no compensation, which rebuilds his skin in the game and allows for incenti...
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作者：Huang, Chao
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when the firms' preference profile satisfies a total unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy this condition.
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all mean-preserving contractions of any given prior over an interval takes the form of a bi-pooling distribution. By implication, every Bayesian persuasion problem with an interval state space admits an optimal bi-poolin...
