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作者:Xiong, Siyang
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要:We provide a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
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作者:Arnold, Lutz G. G.
作者单位:University of Regensburg
摘要:This paper investigates the conditions under which socially responsible investment (SRI) is neutral from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. Three conditions are jointly sufficient for neutrality of SRI. First, the financial market is complete and SRI does not compromise the spanning opportunities it provides. Second, consumers' rankings of consumption bundles are unaffected by their asset holdings. Third, firms maximize shareholder value. Under an additional assumption that is satisf...
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作者:Schottmueller, Christoph
作者单位:University of Cologne
摘要:With the goal of maximizing expected gains from trade, this paper analyzes the jointly optimal information structure and mechanism in a bilateral trade setting. The difference in gains from trade between the optimal information structure and first best constitutes the minimal loss due to asymmetric information. With binary underlying types it is shown that more than 95% of first best can be achieved while the optimal mechanism without information design may achieve less than 90% of first best....
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作者:Flynn, Joel P. P.; Schmidt, Lawrence D. W.; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:We study a general class of consumption-savings problems with recursive preferences. We characterize the sign of the consumption response to arbitrary shocks in terms of the product of two sufficient statistics: the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) between contemporaneous consumption and continuation utility, and the relative elasticity of the marginal value of wealth (REMV). Under homotheticity, the REMV always equals 1, so the propensity of the agent to save or dis-save is alwa...