-
作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Windsor
摘要：We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production...
-
作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
-
作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade is inefficiently delayed. The first-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient.
-
作者：Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Nesterov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Lausanne; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their level of manipulability. This ranking sheds a new light on practical design decisions such as the design of the entry-level medical labor market in the United States, and s...
-
作者：Candogan, Ozan; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We study information design with multiple privately informed agents who interact in a game. Each agent's utility is linear in a real-valued state. We show that there always exists an optimal mechanism that is laminar partitional and bound its complexity. For each type profile, such a mechanism partitions the state space and recommends the same action profile within a partition element. Furthermore, the convex hulls of any two partition elements are such that either one contains the other or th...
-
作者：Beissner, Patrick; Werner, Jan
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：The analysis of optimal risk sharing has been thus far largely restricted to nonexpected utility models with concave utility functions, where concavity is an expression of ambiguity aversion and/or risk aversion. This paper extends the analysis to a-maxmin expected utility, Choquet expected utility, and cumulative prospect theory, which accommodate ambiguity seeking and risk seeking attitudes. We introduce a novel methodology of quasidifferential calculus of Demyanov and Rubinov (1986, 1992) a...
-
作者：Iaryczower, Matias; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Bristol
摘要：We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics, including lobbying, exclusive deals, and acquisition of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents affects efficiency and welfare. We show that when the principal's willingness to pay is large relative to agents' payoffs for completi...
-
作者：Kirpalani, Rishabh; Madsen, Erik
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; New York University
摘要：We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the profitability of a project and when (if ever) to publicly invest in it. Multiple equilibria exist, differing with respect to how much information firms acquire as well as how quickly they invest. The equilibriu...
-
作者：Miyagishima, Kaname
作者单位：Aoyama Gakuin University
摘要：In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we in...
-
作者：Denti, Tommaso
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many strategic environments, information acquisition is a central component of the game that is played. Being uncertain about a payoff-relevant state, a player in a game has a twofold incentive to acquire information: learning the state and learning what others know. We develop a model of information acquisition in games that accounts for players' incentive to learn what others know. In applications to rational inattention and global games, we prove the power of this incentive. When informa...
