作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We use an evolutionary model to determine which misperceptions can persist. Every period, a new generation of agents use their subjective models and the data generated by the previous generation to update their beliefs, and models that induce better actions become more prevalent. An equilibrium can resist mutations that lead agents to use a model that better fits the equilibrium data but induce the mutated agents to take an action with lower payoffs. We characterize which steady states resist ...
作者：Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio
作者单位：Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We consider collective decision-making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a techniq...
