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作者：Cuny, Christine
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I investigate the trade-off between capital market incentives, reputational concerns, and administrative costs in the public disclosure decisions of municipal bond issuers. After Ambac's bankruptcy, issuers of insured debt increase disclosure relative to issuers of uninsured debt. After local per capita income declines or expenditures increase, issuers, particularly those with strong electoral incentives and weak voter oversight, reduce disclosure. After the implementation of an online filing ...
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作者：Cai, Ye; Kim, Yongtae; Park, Jong Chool; White, Hal D.
作者单位：Santa Clara University; Old Dominion University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that ...
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作者：Dou, Yiwei; Khan, Mozaffar; Zou, Youli
作者单位：New York University; Harvard University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; George Washington University
摘要：We provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long-run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees' perceptions of employment security. In particular, we exploit exogenous state-level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward earnings management when benefits increase. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant reduction in abnormal accruals, increased recognition of special items and write downs, and greater likel...
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作者：Shroff, Nemit
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Bernard (2016) proposes that financially constrained firms susceptible to product market predation are more likely to avoid complying with a mandatory requirement to publicly disclose financial statements. Bernard tests and finds that financially constrained private firms in Germany are less likely to disclose their financial statements despite being subject to a law requiring them to do so and interprets this evidence as consistent with predation risk affecting firms' disclosure decisions. I ...
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作者：Baldenius, Tim; Glover, Jonathan; Xue, Hao
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit contract that specifies a minimum bonus pool as a function of the verifiable measure and an implicit contract that gives the principal discretion to increase the size of the pool and to allocate it among the agents. To mitigate the threat of collusion, the optimal contract often converts any exogenous productive interdepe...
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作者：Guay, Wayne; Samuels, Delphine; Taylor, Daniel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A growing literature documents that complex financial statements negatively affect the information environment. In this paper, we examine whether managers use voluntary disclosure to mitigate these negative effects. Employing cross-sectional and within-firm designs, we find a robust positive relation between financial statement complexity and voluntary disclosure. This relation is stronger when liquidity decreases around the filing of the financial statements, is stronger when firms have more ...
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作者：Kausar, Asad; Shroff, Nemit; White, Hal
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We hypothesize that the choice to obtain a financial statement audit provides external financiers with incremental information about the firm, which helps reduce information asymmetry and financing frictions. Using a natural experiment, we show that when external financiers observe a firm's choice to voluntarily obtain an audit, the firms obtaining an audit significantly increase their debt, investment, and operating performance, and become more responsive to their investment opportunities. Fu...
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作者：Hoitash, Rani; Hoitash, Udi; Kurt, Ahmet C.
作者单位：Bentley University; Northeastern University; Suffolk University
摘要：We examine whether chief financial officers (CFOs) with accounting backgrounds (accountant CFOs) are associated with more conservative corporate outcomes. We find that, in high-growth industries, firms with accountant CFOs invest less in research and development and capital expenditures and are less likely to engage in external financing. In low-growth industries, we find that firms with accountant CFOs exhibit greater cost efficiency. Our results are consistent with risk aversion on the part ...
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作者：Banker, Rajiv D.; Basu, Sudipta; Byzalov, Dmitri; Chen, Janice Y. S.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; University of the Pacific
摘要：Sales decreases affect earnings more than sales increases because of cost stickiness. We hypothesize that this correlated omitted variable constitutes a confounding effect in standard asymmetric timeliness models. Controlling for a piecewise linear effect of sales changes in these models decreases the measured asymmetric timeliness significantly and changes inferences about the average level of conservatism and the extent of cross-sectional variation in conservatism. Validation tests confirm t...
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作者：Martin, Patrick R.; Moser, Donald V.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Although managers' green investments have no impact on future cash flows in our experimental markets, investors respond favorably when managers make and disclose an investment and highlight the societal benefits rather than the cost to the company. Managers anticipate investors' reaction and therefore often disclose their investment and the associated societal benefits. Managers and other shareholders benefit from investors' reaction, but the investment cost always exceeds this benefit, demons...
