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作者：Demerjian, Peter R.; Owens, Edward L.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Emory University
摘要：We measure the probability that a borrower will violate financial covenants in private debt contracts. We analyze hand-coded data and specify standard covenant definitions using Compustat data that minimize measurement error for all individual Dealscan covenants. We use these definitions to create a measure of aggregate probability of violation, which can be used across all covenants in a loan or among covenant subsets of interest. We provide evidence that our aggregate probability measure is ...
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作者：Li, Ningzhong; Vasvari, Florin P.; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of London; London Business School; University of Southern California
摘要：We examine the role of dynamic covenant threshold values in syndicated loan agreements. We document that 45% of syndicated loans specify dynamic covenant thresholds in earnings-based covenants and that these changing thresholds typically become tighter over the life of a loan. We find that covenants with a tight trend provide an important signaling mechanism that meets the needs of borrowers that experience an inferior financial performance at loan initiation but expect future performance impr...
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作者：Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Lamoreaux, Phillip T.; Litov, Lubomir P.; Neyland, Jordan B.
作者单位：University of Arizona; Korea University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Melbourne
摘要：We examine the impact of shared auditors, defined as audit firms that provide audit services to a target and its acquirer firm prior to an acquisition, on transaction outcomes. We find shared auditors are observed in nearly a quarter of all public acquisitions and targets are more likely to receive a bid from a firm that has the same auditor. Moreover, these shared auditor deals are associated with significantly lower deal premiums, lower target event returns, higher bidder event returns, and ...
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作者：Rhodes, Adrienne
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：I investigate how implicit incentives provided by earnings-based debt covenants affect the structure of CEO compensation contracts. This provides a new and unique view of how the CEO's incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also debt contracts. I find when debt contracts contain an earnings-based covenant, the CEO's pay sensitivity to earnings is muted. Additionally, I find some evidence that pay sensitivity to earnings varies with earnings-based covenant slack. This s...
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作者：Arif, Salman; Marshall, Nathan; Yohn, Teri Lombardi
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Accruals are fundamental to financial reporting and are the underlying innovation of accounting. Despite this, accounting research has provided little understanding of how economic forces affect a firm's level of accruals and limited guidance for forming expectations of accruals based on ex ante firm characteristics. We consider accruals as a form of investment and examine whether theoretical predictions from a real options-based investment framework provide insight into the relation between a...
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作者：Huyghebaert, Nancy; Xu, Weidong
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：Investment banks and issuers of Chinese domestic IPOs became fully responsible for IPO offer prices only on June 10, 2009. Before this regulatory reform, the optimistic bias in post-IPO earnings forecasts is highly comparable across affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Afterward, the forecasts of affiliated analysts are 33 percentage points more positively distorted on average. In the first 90 days after an IPO, this relative forecast bias even increases to 63 percentage points and enlarges f...
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作者：Guan, Yuyan; Su, Lixin (Nancy); Wu, Donghui; Yang, Zhifeng
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We identify connected auditors as those who attended the same university as the executives of their clients. Using manually collected data from China, we find that connected auditors are more likely to issue favorable audit opinions, especially for financially distressed clients. Moreover, companies audited by connected auditors report significantly higher discretionary accruals, are more likely to subsequently restate earnings downward, and have lower earnings response coefficients. Lastly, c...
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作者：Garcia Lara, Juan Manuel; Garcia Osma, Beatriz; Penalva, Fernando
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Autonomous University of Madrid; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency. In particular, we predict that it resolves debt-equity conflicts, facilitating a firm's access to debt financing and limiting under investment. This permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued. Our empirical results confirm these predictions. We find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms c...
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作者：Chen, Peter F.; He, Shaohua; Ma, Zhiming; Stice, Derrald
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Lancaster University; Peking University
摘要：This study examines the relevance of modified audit opinions (MAO) in private debt contracting. We use the auditor's explanatory language to partition MAOs into Inconsistency opinions, resulting from an accounting change or a restatement; and Inadequacy opinions, arising from a material uncertainty or a going concern (GC) opinion. Using the loan contracts of firms with MAOs, we find that, compared with loans issued in the year after a clean opinion, loans issued in the year after an MAO are as...
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作者：Call, Andrew C.; Kedia, Simi; Rajgopal, Shivaram
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Columbia University
摘要：We find that firms grant more rank and file stock options when involved in financial reporting violations, consistent with managements' incentives to discourage employee whistle-blowing. Violating firms grant more rank and file options during periods of misreporting relative to control firms and to their own option grants in non-violation years. Moreover, misreporting firms that grant more rank and file options during violation years are more likely to avoid whistle-blowing allegations. Althou...
