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作者:Ham, Charles; Koharki, Kevin
作者单位:Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要:This paper examines whether bond market participants alter their credit risk assessments of firms that appoint the corporate general counsel (GC) to senior management. GCs may place less emphasis on their gatekeeping responsibilities upon appointment to senior management, thus potentially resulting in increased firm credit risk. Using changes in firm-level credit ratings and credit default swap spreads to proxy for changes in credit risk, we find a positive association between GC promotions to...
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作者:Tian, Xuan; Udell, Gregory F.; Yu, Xiaoyun
作者单位:Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Tsinghua University
摘要:Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm's reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VC...
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作者:Amiram, Dan; Owens, Edward; Rozenbaum, Oded
作者单位:Columbia University; Emory University; George Washington University
摘要:Prior literature documents that both earnings announcements and management earnings forecasts increase information asymmetry at announcement. In contrast, we predict and document that analyst earnings forecasts decrease information asymmetry at announcement. As expected, this directional contrast is temporary, in that all three information release types lead to a decrease in information asymmetry following the short-window announcement period. Our evidence demonstrates that the direction of th...
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作者:Dyer, Travis; Lang, Mark; Stice-Lawrence, Lorien
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要:Guay et al. (2016) document that firms with longer and more complex 10-Ks provide relatively more voluntary disclosure, which they interpret as evidence that managers use voluntary disclosure to mitigate negative. effects of complex mandatory disclosure. We review the results of Guay et al. and focus on two main challenges to inferring causality: (1) the coincidence of upward over-time trends in annual report length, complexity, and voluntary disclosure, and (2) the potential for omitted corre...
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作者:Laux, Christian
作者单位:Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要:When the Federal Reserve, following Basel III, proposed removing the accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) filter that shields regulatory capital from unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) debt securities, it triggered fierce opposition. The topic is at the heart of the debate about the role of fair value accounting for financial stability. Chircop and Novotny-Farkas (2016) investigate banks' stock price reaction and investment behavior around news events up to the an...
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作者:Dhaliwal, Dan; Judd, J. Scott; Serfling, Matthew; Shaikh, Sarah
作者单位:University of Arizona; Korea University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要:This study investigates the relation between customer concentration and a supplier's cost of equity capital. We hypothesize that a more concentrated customer base increases a supplier's risk, which results in a higher cost of equity. Our results show a positive association between customer concentration and a supplier's cost of equity, and this relation is more pronounced for suppliers that are more likely to lose major customers or that are more prone to larger losses if they lose such custom...
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作者:Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:Many investments are noted for their beauty contest features in that decision makers desire conformity with others' choices due to inherent complementarities. This paper examines the incentives of firms to take preemptive action and publicly disclose their investments in such beauty contests. In this case, it is the beauty contest desire for coordination that incentivizes a firm to disclose because doing so allows it to convey information that establishes norms and thereby influence subsequent...
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作者:Fich, Eliezer M.; Rice, Edward M.; Tran, Anh L.
作者单位:Drexel University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; City St Georges, University of London
摘要:Do merger bonuses to target CEOs facilitate a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders? We test this hypothesis against an alternative that bonuses enable a useful contractual revision in compensation contracts when takeovers generate small synergies. When target CEOs get a merger bonus, acquirers pay lower premiums, but they also typically get less in the form of low synergies. Moreover, both stock and accounting returns to the acquirers are lower on average in deals with target C...
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作者:Chircop, Justin; Novotny-Farkas, Zoltan
作者单位:Lancaster University
摘要:We investigate the economic consequences of the Basel III requirement to include unrealized fair value gains and losses on available-for-sale (AFS) securities in regulatory capital. Using data for U.S. banks we find negative market reactions around news indicating an increased likelihood of this regulatory change being implemented, consistent with increased regulatory costs. We also find that banks affected by this regulation reduce their investment in risky AFS securities relative to unaffect...
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作者:Akbas, Ferhat; Meschke, Felix; Wintoki, M. Babajide
作者单位:University of Kansas
摘要:We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earni...