Relational contracts with and between agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baldenius, Tim; Glover, Jonathan; Xue, Hao
• 署名单位: New York University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.01.002
• 发表日期: 2016
• 关键词: performance-measures; implicit contracts; incentives; indicators; collusion

摘要

We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit contract that specifies a minimum bonus pool as a function of the verifiable measure and an implicit contract that gives the principal discretion to increase the size of the pool and to allocate it among the agents. To mitigate the threat of collusion, the optimal contract often converts any exogenous productive interdependence into strategic payoff independence for the agents. Under productive complements, an unconditional bonus pool (pay without performance) can be less costly than one conditioned on the verifiable team measure. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.