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作者：Glaeser, Stephen; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the dissemination of mine safety information in SEC filings has real effects on mine safety. We discuss the extent to which Christensen et al.'s results generalize to a research question that we consider of broader interest to accounting researchers, specifically where and when mandated disclosure in SEC filings can increase the dissemination of information. We also discuss identification of causal effects and generalizability concerns more broad...
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作者：Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart; Laux, Volker
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper examines the role of the financial reporting environment in selecting a new CEO from within versus outside the organization. Weak reporting controls allow the CEO to misreport performance information, which reduces the board's ability to detect and replace poorly-performing CEOs as well as aggravates incentive contracting. We show that these adverse effects are stronger when the CEO is an outsider rather than an insider. Our model predicts that boards are more likely to recruit a CE...
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作者：Caskey, Judson; Ozel, N. Bugra
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We examine the relation between workplace safety and managers' attempts to meet earnings expectations. Using establishment-level data on workplace safety from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, we document significantly higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts compared to firms that miss or comfortably beat analyst forecasts. The higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts are associated with both increases ...
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作者：Akins, Brian; Dou, Yiwei; Ng, Jeffrey
作者单位：Rice University; New York University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
摘要：Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less asso...
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作者：Schoenfeld, Jordan
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：This study tests whether voluntary disclosure affects stock liquidity. I argue that index funds fit the profile of nonstrategic traders who, according to theory, are unambiguously more likely than managers and strategic investors to prefer high stock liquidity and thus high disclosure. This suggests that I can use index funds' disclosure preferences to construct an empirical model of voluntary disclosure that abstracts away from managers' strategic disclosure motives. Accordingly, I use an ind...
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作者：Fung, Simon Yu Kit; Raman, K. K.; Zhu, Xindong (Kevin)
作者单位：Deakin University; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program improves audit quality for a sample of non-US-listed foreign public client companies from 55 countries audited by foreign (i.e., non-US) auditors. For a sample of non-US-listed clients of PCAOB-registered foreign auditors, we find that initial PCAOB inspections improve audit quality, over and above the threat of such inspections, for foreign auditors' non-US-listed foreign clients. Our fin...
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作者：Shroff, Nemit; Verdi, Rodrigo S.; Yost, Benjamin P.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Boston College
摘要：This paper examines whether and when the information environment of peer firms in an industry affects the cost of capital for other firms in the industry. We predict and find that the peer information environment is negatively associated with a firm's cost of capital when there is less publicly available firm-specific information and this negative association shrinks as the amount of firm-specific information increases. This paper provides evidence that information about peer-firms has externa...
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作者：Baylis, Richard M.; Burnap, Peter; Clatworthy, Mark A.; Gad, Mahmoud A.; Pong, Christopher K. M.
作者单位：Cardiff University; Cardiff University; University of Bristol; Tilburg University; Heriot Watt University
摘要：We study clauses in private lending agreements requiring auditors to assure lenders of borrowers' compliance with financial covenants. Auditors are required under general purpose financial reporting to review covenant compliance. However, by informing lenders directly that they have no knowledge of default, auditors may increase their litigation risk. We find that auditor covenant compliance assurance clauses are significantly associated with more complex contractual adjustments to .net income...
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作者：Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper discusses evidence that large, diversified banks lend using 'hard' information measures, such as audited financial statements. Structural changes toward larger and more diversified banks may have left some segments of credit markets - those depending on investment in 'soft' information - under-served. These trends accelerated following the Financial Crisis. At the same time, bank lending to small businesses, which typically can only supply soft information, has been slow to recover ...
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作者：Gallo, Lindsey A.; Hann, Rebecca N.; Li, Congcong
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Singapore Management University
摘要：This paper examines whether the negative association between aggregate earnings and returns is explained by the monetary policy news in aggregate earnings. Using Federal funds futures data to construct a measure of policy news, we find that aggregate earnings convey information about the Fed's policy actions. Additionally, the negative aggregate earnings-returns association is muted when we control for policy surprises. This result is more pronounced in periods with negative policy surprises, ...
