Voluntary disclosure incentives: Evidence from the municipal bond market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cuny, Christine
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.04.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 关键词: information

摘要

I investigate the trade-off between capital market incentives, reputational concerns, and administrative costs in the public disclosure decisions of municipal bond issuers. After Ambac's bankruptcy, issuers of insured debt increase disclosure relative to issuers of uninsured debt. After local per capita income declines or expenditures increase, issuers, particularly those with strong electoral incentives and weak voter oversight, reduce disclosure. After the implementation of an online filing repository, issuers with few dissemination channels increase disclosure relative to other issuers. Overall, my findings support a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure, risk, and low-cost dissemination, to the extent reputational capital is not threatened. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.