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作者：Parlaktürk, AK; Kumar, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from se...
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作者：Dong, LX; Rudi, N
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Rochester
摘要：This paper studies how transshipments affect manufacturers and retailers, considering both exogenous and endogenous wholesale prices., For a distribution system where a single manufacturer sells to multiple identical-cost retailers, we consider both the manufacturer being a price taker and the manufacturer being a price setter in a single-period setup under multivariate normal demand distribution. In the case of the manufacturer being a price taker, we provide several analytical results regard...
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作者：Bajaj, A; Kekre, S; Srinivasan, K
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：In this field study, conducted at a leading avionics guidance systems manufacturer, we gathered primary data on time and cost performance of both the design and manufacturing phases of new product development (NPD). We modeled the impact of the management levers relating to oversight, the intensity of design specialization, and the level of interaction with the customer. The study highlights the necessity of leveraging the interdependencies between the design and manufacturing phases in NPD.
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作者：Jarrar, R; Martín-Herrán, G; Zaccour, G
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universidad de Valladolid
摘要：We propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the Lanchester model. The algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package, and, importantly, it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate, an assumption that has been made in the literature.
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作者：Ho, TH; Tang, CS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This special issue, by addressing problems surrounding marketing and operations management, depicts state-of-the-art approaches, methodologies, and insights to improve a firm's or supply chain's overall performance. Top scholars in the field address many of the ways in which companies can synchronize their marketing and operations departments or their supply chain partners to improve competitiveness and profit. The information in this issue should be of interest both to academics and managers,...
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作者：Ho, TH; Zheng, YS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Service firms have increasingly been competing for market share on the basis of delivery time. Many firms now choose to set customer expectation by announcing their maximal delivery time. Customers will be satisfied if their perceived delivery times are shorter than their expectations. This gap model of service quality is used in this paper to study how a firm might choose a delivery-time commitment to influence its customer expectation, and delivery quality in order to maximize its market sha...
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作者：Montmarquette, C; Rullière, JL; Villeval, MC; Zeiliger, R
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits, and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a...
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作者：Afèche, P; Mendelson, H
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper studies alternative price-service mechanisms for a provider that serves customers whose delay cost depends on their service valuations. We propose a generalized delay cost structure that augments the standard additive model with a multiplicative component, capturing the interdependence between delay cost and values. We derive and compare the revenue-maximizing and socially optimal equilibria under uniform pricing, preemptive, and nonpreemptive priority auctions with an admission pri...
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作者：Corbett, CJ; Zhou, DM; Tang, CS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：T his paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer's cost structure, and of being able to offer more general contracts. We use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios: three increasingly general contracts (wholesale-pricing schemes, two-part linear schemes, and two-part nonlinear schemes), each under full and incomplete information about the buyer's cost structure. We allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation ...
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作者：Bertschek, I; Kaiser, U
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between investment in information and communication technologies (ICT), non-ICT investment, labor productivity, and workplace reorganization. Firms are assumed to reorganize workplaces if the productivity gains arising from workplace reorganization exceed the associated reorganization costs. Two different types of organizational change are considered: enhancement group work and flattening of hierarchies. Empirical evidence is provided for a sample of 411 fi...
