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作者：Narayanan, VG; Raman, A; Singh, J
作者单位：Harvard University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：In this paper, we model a manufacturer that contracts with two retailers, who then choose retail prices and stocking quantities endogenously in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If the manufacturer designs a contract that is accepted by both retailers, it sets the wholesale price as a compromise between two conflicting roles: reducing intrabrand retail price competition and inducing retailers to stock closer to first-best levels (that is, optimum for the supply chain as a whole). In equilibrium, fi...
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作者：Ho, TH; Weigelt, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：The trust-building process is basic to social science. We investigate it in a laboratory setting using a novel multistage trust game where social gains are achieved if players trust each other in each stage. In each stage, also, players have an opportunity to appropriate these gains or be trustworthy by sharing them. Players are strangers because they do not know the identity of others and, they will not play them again. Thus, there is no prospect of future interaction to induce trusting behav...
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作者：Anandalingam, G; Day, RW; Raghavan, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Connecticut
摘要：This paper presents an introductory survey for this special issue of Management Science on electronic markets. We acquaint the reader with some fundamental concepts in the study of electronic market mechanisms, while simultaneously presenting a survey and summary of the essential literature in this area. Along the way, we position each of the papers presented in this. special issue within the existing literature demonstrating the deep impact of these 14 articles on an already broad body of kno...
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作者：Bernstein, F; Federgruen, A
作者单位：Duke University; Columbia University
摘要：In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We also design contractual arrangements between the parties that allow the decentralized chain to perform as well as a centralized one. We address these questions in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of (competing) retailers, considering the following general model: Retailers face random demands, the distribut...
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作者：Gallien, J; Wein, LM
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University
摘要：We address the problem of designing multi-item procurement auctions for a monopsonistic buyer in capacity-constrained environments. Using insights from classical auction theory, we construct an optimization-based auction mechanism (smart market) relying on the dynamic resolution of a linear program minimizing the buyer's cost under the suppliers' capacity constraints. Suppliers can modify their offers in response to the optimal allocation corresponding to each set of bids, giving rise to a dyn...
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作者：Kannan, K; Telang, R
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Software vulnerability disclosure has become a critical area of concern for policyrnakers. Traditionally, a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) acts as an infomediary between benign identifiers (who voluntarily report vulnerability information) and software users. After verifying a reported vulnerability CERT sends out a public advisory so that users can safeguard their systems against potential exploits. Lately, firms such as Defense have been implementing a new market-based approach for ...
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作者：Geng, XJ; Stinchcombe, MB; Whinston, AB
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Consumers' average value for information goods, websites, weather forecasts, music, and news declines with the number consumed. This paper provides simple guidelines to optimal bundling marketing strategies in this case. If consumers' values do not decrease too quickly, we show that bundling is approximately optimal. If consumers' values to subsequent goods decrease quickly, we show by example that one should expect bundling to be suboptimal.
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作者：Kwon, RH; Anandalingam, G; Ungar, LH
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In combinatorial auctions, multiple distinct items are sold simultaneously and a bidder may place a single bid on a set (package) of distinct items. The determination of packages for bidding is a nontrivial task, and existing efficient formats require that bidders know the set of packages and/or their valuations. In this paper, we extend an efficient ascending combinatorial auction mechanism to use approximate single-item pricing. The single-item prices in each round are derived from a linear ...
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作者：Markovitch, DG; Steckel, JH; Yeung, B
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; New York University
摘要：Financial theory posits that capital markets convey through stock prices their expectation of the firm's future performance. We use concepts from principal-agent theory and prospect theory to provide a theoretical explanation for the role stock price variation plays in managerial decision making. We then empirically investigate what specific decisions managers undertake in response to stock price variation. We perform our empirical analyses in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. We fin...
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作者：Balachandran, KR; Radhakrishnan, S
作者单位：New York University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We examine a supply chain in which the final product consists of components made by a buyer and a supplier. In the single moral-hazard case, the buyer's quality is observable, whereas in the double moral-hazard case, the buyer's quality is not observable. The supplier's quality is not observable in both the single and double moral-hazard cases. In each case, we examine a warranty/penalty contract between the buyer and the supplier based on information from incoming inspection and external fail...
