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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We consider a platform that provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform'...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents, but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff and construct equilibria that attain this payoff. Since the patient player's Stackelberg action is mixed and motivating the lowest-benefit type to play mixed actions is costly, every type's ...
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作者：Miao, Jianjun; Wu, Jieran; Young, Eric R.
作者单位：Boston University; Zhejiang University; University of Virginia
摘要：We provide a production-based asset pricing model with dispersed information and small deviations from full rational expectations. In the model, aggregate output and equity prices depend on the higher-order beliefs about aggregate demand and individual stochastic discount factors. We prove that equity price volatility becomes arbitrarily large as the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks diverges to infinity due to the interaction of signal extraction with idiosyncratic trading decisions, while a...
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作者：Akin, Sumeyra
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and...
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作者：Baumann, Leonie
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either reciprocal or nonreciprocal. In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link between them. In a nonreciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into concentrated and diversified agents, and a concentrated agent is only linked to dive...
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作者：Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against one another. Applications of the value in economics have been rare, at least in part because the existing definition (for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that does no...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusi...
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作者：Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownershi...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Danieli, Alexander; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：New York University; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Arizona
摘要：The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R(m-1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m-best response sequence (m-BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive-for...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study a class of macroeconomic models in which all firms can costlessly choose any price at each date from an interval (indexed to last period's price level) that includes a positive lower bound. I prove three results that are valid for any such half-closed interval (regardless of how near zero the left endpoint is). First, given any output sequence that is uniformly bounded from above by the moneyless equilibrium output level, that bounded output sequence is an equilibrium outcome for a (po...
