The design of multidimensional auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Branco, F
• 署名单位: Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2555940
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 63-81
• 关键词: surplus

摘要

Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation on the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent-costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two-stage auction: in the first stage the procurer selects one firm; in the second stage he bargains to readjust the level of quality to be provided.