Collusion under monitoring of sales
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
署名单位：
Johns Hopkins University; Stanford University
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00070.x
发表日期：
2007
页码：
314-331
关键词：
摘要：
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored whenfirms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas. In practice, cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.
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