Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Donna, Javier D.; Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12221
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 87-127
• 关键词: joint executive-committee; multiunit demand auctions; service timber sales; 1st-price auctions; unobserved heterogeneity; cartel stability; english auctions; uniform-price; collusion; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with noncooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.