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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the democratic peace hypothesis (i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another). We show that, when information asymmetries and strategic complements are present in the conflict resolution game, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from that of any other dyad. In our model, the interaction of two democracies produces the highest probability that a conflict will be peacefully resolved. But, it takes two dem...
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作者：Besley, Timothy
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits. This model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. We also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous. The main ideas in the model are confronted with data on U.S. governors....
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作者：Besley, Timothy; Rahman, Lupin; Pande, Rohini; Rao, Vijayendra
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Yale University; The World Bank
摘要：This paper uses village and household survey data from South India to examine how political geography and politician identity impacts on public good provision. We provide evidence that the nature of this relationship varies by type of public good. For high spillover public goods residential proximity to elected representative matters. In contrast, for low spillover public goods sharing the politician's group identity is what matters. (JEL: D78, H40)
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作者：Stutzer, Alois; Lalive, Rafael
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Social norms are usually neglected in economics, because they are to a large extent enforced through nonmarket interactions and difficult to isolate empirically. In this paper, we offer a direct measure of the social norm to work and we show that this norm has important economic effects. The stronger the norm, the more quickly unemployed people find a new job. This behavior can be explained by utility differences, probably due to social pressure. Unemployed people are significantly less happy ...
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作者：Adao, Bernardino; Teles, Pedro; Correia, Isabel
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study environments with sticky prices, wages, or portfolios where it is feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under full flexibility. In these environments the optimal policy does not depend on the scope of the frictions. In this sense, the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. So, asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not impose a cost on a common policy. (JEL: E31, E41, E5...
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作者：Hanushek, Eric A.; Raymond, Margaret E.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The use of school accountability in the United States to improve student performance began in the separate states during the 1980s and was elevated through the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Evaluating the impact of accountability is difficult because it applies to entire states and can be confused with other changes in the states. We consider how the differential introduction of accountability across states affects growth in student performance on the National Assessment of Educati...
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作者：Ljungqvist, Lars; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
摘要：We recalibrate den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey's matching model to incorporate our preferred specification of turbulence as causing distinct dynamics of human capital after voluntary and involuntary job losses. Under our calibration, with high unemployment benefits, an increase in turbulence increases the unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment while leaving the inflow rate into unemployment roughly unchanged, mirroring features of European data in the 1980s and 1990s. The essential iss...
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作者：Olofsgard, Anders
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation. This general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader (the expert) influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation. I show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader, to receive biased information that...
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作者：Fecht, Falko
作者单位：Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond and Dybvig style and a financial market coexist is modeled in a simple framework closely related to Diamond (1997). Solely depending on the fraction of naive households who cannot efficiently invest directly in the corporate sector, two different types of financial systems emerge. With the fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented, whereas a high fraction brings about a bank-dominated fi...
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作者：Falconieri, Sonia; Palomino, Frederic; Sakovics, Jozsef
作者单位：Tilburg University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Edinburgh
摘要：In many countries, the collective sale of television rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, the leagues won in court, on the ground that sport is not a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of television rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare point of view. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when (a) lea...
