PAYING POLITICIANS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Besley, Timothy
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247604323067925
发表日期：
2004
页码：
193-215
关键词：
摘要：
This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits. This model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. We also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous. The main ideas in the model are confronted with data on U.S. governors. (JEL: D72, J33)
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