IT TAKES TWO: AN EXPLANATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247604323015463
发表日期：
2004
关键词：
摘要：
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the democratic peace hypothesis (i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another). We show that, when information asymmetries and strategic complements are present in the conflict resolution game, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from that of any other dyad. In our model, the interaction of two democracies produces the highest probability that a conflict will be peacefully resolved. But, it takes two democracies for peace; a conflict involving only one democracy will not be resolved in a peaceful way more often than a conflict involving two nondemocratic regimes. (JEL: D82, D74)
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