SECESSIONS AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM: WHY REGIONAL REFERENDA DO NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olofsgard, Anders
• 署名单位: Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/1542476042782279
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 805-832
• 关键词: cheap-talk; INFORMATION; MODEL

摘要

This paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation. This general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader (the expert) influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation. I show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader, to receive biased information that increases their bargaining power over the gains of staying unified. However, a trade-off between bargaining power and precision of information causes inefficient outcomes in equilibrium. (JEL: C73, D72, D82, H77)