THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM: IS IT RELEVANT FOR POLICY?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Adao, Bernardino; Teles, Pedro; Correia, Isabel
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247604323068014
发表日期：
2004
页码：
310-319
关键词：
摘要：
We study environments with sticky prices, wages, or portfolios where it is feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under full flexibility. In these environments the optimal policy does not depend on the scope of the frictions. In this sense, the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy. So, asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not impose a cost on a common policy. (JEL: E31, E41, E58, E62)
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