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作者：Maskin, Eric
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作者：Fella, Giulio; Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco
作者单位：University of London
摘要：In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. (JEL: C78, J120)
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作者：Gebhardt, Georg
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Chicago
摘要：Drawing on recent advances in the study of reference dependent utility we model financial markets as a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Asset valuations may change endogenously through re-coordination which induces fluctuations in output. These fluctuations are shown to be quantitatively relevant and inefficient. (JEL: G12)
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作者：Petrongolo, Barbara
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper presents evidence on gender segregation in employment contracts in 15 E.U. countries, using microdata from the ECHPS. Women are overrepresented in part-time jobs in all countries considered, but while in northern Europe such allocation roughly reflects women's preferences and their need to combine work with child care, in southern Europe part-time jobs are often involuntary and provide significantly lower job satisfaction than full-time ones. Women are also overrepresented in fixed-...
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作者：Dasgupta, Amil
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks. The equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined. We explore how the cross-holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious effects conditional on the failure of a financial institution. We show that contagious bank failure occurs with positive probability in the unique equilibrium of the econo...
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作者：Guembel, Alexander; Sussman, Oren
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Motivated by the observation that exchange-rate management resembles market-making, we use microstructure theory to conduct a welfare analysis of exchange-rate management, including the corner solutions of a free float and a fixed peg. We show that a policy that smoothes out exchange-rate fluctuations needs to trade off the welfare gain due to lower risk exposure of local producers against the trading losses that the policy would generate due to speculation. We identify the conditions under wh...
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作者：Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. Voters update their beliefs rationally given the information they have received. The paper us...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London; University of Bonn
摘要：Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license auctions, privatizations, etc.) shape the industry structure. Are there mechanisms that induce an efficient industry structure (at least when there are no positive costs to public funds)? The answer is no whenever firms have private information about both fixed and marginal costs. Our analysis also suggests that the second-best industry may either be more competitive or more monopolistic than the first-best one. These insights ...
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作者：Khwaja, Asim Ijaz
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper considers the impact of community participation on outcomes of development projects. It first offers a theoretical framework for participation by using the property rights literature to model how participation in an activity, in addition to involving information exchange, also results in greater influence in the activity. The model predicts that community participation may not always be desirable. The paper then uses primary data on development projects in Northern Pakistan to provi...
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作者：Baker, Michael; Hanna, Emily; Kantarevic, Jasmin
作者单位：University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government policies. Empirical evidence of their behavioral effects is quite mixed, which is surprising because economic theory predicts that they should have an impact on the headship decision. We investigate the removal of marriage penalties from the surviving spouse pensions of the Canadian public pension system in the 1980s. These reforms provide a simple and transparent source of identification. Our results indicate that marriage pena...
