THE DESIGN OF AN EFFICIENT PRIVATE INDUSTRY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/154247604323068195
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 516-525
• 关键词: Auctions

摘要

Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license auctions, privatizations, etc.) shape the industry structure. Are there mechanisms that induce an efficient industry structure (at least when there are no positive costs to public funds)? The answer is no whenever firms have private information about both fixed and marginal costs. Our analysis also suggests that the second-best industry may either be more competitive or more monopolistic than the first-best one. These insights are in sharp contrast with the ones obtained for models where firms have one-dimensional private information, thus requiring more delicate policy recommendations. (JEL: D43, D45, D82, L1)