POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Coate, Stephen
署名单位：
Cornell University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/1542476042782251
发表日期：
2004
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. Voters update their beliefs rationally given the information they have received. The paper uses the theory to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits. Such limits are shown to redistribute welfare from ordinary citizens to members of interest groups. (JEL: D72, H40)
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