DOES DIVORCE LAW MATTER?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fella, Giulio; Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco
• 署名单位: University of London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/1542476041423359
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 607-633
• 关键词: marriage

摘要

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. (JEL: C78, J120)