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作者：Jeong, Dahyeon; Shenoy, Ajay; Zimmermann, Laura, V
作者单位：The World Bank; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Governments and NGOs have invested heavily in fighting corruption by designing anti-poverty programs that maximize transparency and accountability. We analyze whether corruption is still widespread in the context of one such program, a massive make-work scheme in India where every job spell is posted publicly online. Linking millions of administrative job records to local election outcomes, we measure how many jobs local politicians self-deal. In the year after the election, winners of close e...
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作者：Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Ines
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; York University - Canada; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nat-ure. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real -world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe a...
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作者：Lambais, Guilherme; Sigstad, Henrik
作者单位：Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon (ICS-UL); Universidade de Lisboa; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Are politicians in power treated more leniently in court? We show that Brazilian mayoral candidates charged with misconduct are 65 percent less likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election. Politicians play no direct role in the judges' careers, suggesting that formal independence does not completely insulate the judiciary from political influence. The effect is driven by districts with few judges and by judges with higher career instability. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by El...
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作者：Kim, Donghyuk
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：When jurisdictions use business incentives to compete for firms, the political payoffs of winning firms are privately derived by the politicians of the winning jurisdictions, but the economic payoffs, such as new jobs, can spill over to the residents of non-winning jurisdictions. I study how potential political payoffs shape government competition for firms using a simple model of government competition and firm loca-tion choice. I use the model to propose an empirical approach of deriving low...
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作者：Decerf, Benoit
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Multidimensional poverty measures are increasingly used in practice even though they face criticism and generate long-lasting debates. These contentions primarily find their origin in the divergence between standard poverty identification practices and a preference-based definition of the poor. This paper fills this gap by proposing a poverty measurement theory that (i) adopts a preference-based definition of the poor, (ii) acknowledges that the relevant preference is only partially known and ...
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作者：Cullen, Zoe; Perez-Truglia, Ricardo
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The diffusion of salary information has implications for labor markets, such as wage discrimination poli-cies and collective bargaining. Access to salary information is believed to be limited and unequal, but there is little direct evidence on the sources of these information frictions. Social scientists have long con-jectured that privacy norms around salary (i.e., the salary taboo) play an important role. We provide unique evidence of this phenomenon based on a field experiment with 755 empl...
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作者：Janeba, Eckhard; Schulz, Karl
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of St Gallen
摘要：Migration and general equilibrium forces are both known to limit the extent of redistribution due to a migration threat and a trickle-down rationale, respectively. In this paper, we consider these two forces jointly and study the optimal nonlinear taxation of internationally mobile workers in general equilib-rium. We show that both forces partly offset each other. In general equilibrium, migration may lower the bottom tax rate but raises the top tax rate, challenging the classical migration-th...
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作者：Schmutz, Benoit; Verdugo, Gregory
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris Saclay; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Using thirty years of municipal elections in France, we show that election results affect the share of immi-grants across municipalities. In municipalities where a left-instead of right-wing mayor has been elected, the share of immigrants in the population grows faster by 1.5 p.p. within six years after the elections, and by 3 p.p. within twelve years. To a large extent, these effects are driven by partisan differences in public housing constructions and changes in the composition of the popul...
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作者：Bertoni, Marco; Nistico, Roberto
作者单位：University of Padua; University of York - UK; University of Naples Federico II; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Exposure to high-ability peers entails positive learning externalities, but it also decreases students' academic self-concept because of lower ordinal ability rank. We show that, as a result, the linear-in-means parameter identifies a composite (i.e., reduced form) effect. We illustrate the empirical relevance of this issue using data from two experiments that randomly assign students to groups. We find that the structural effect of mean peer ability estimated by a model that includes rank is ...
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作者：Lardeux, Raphael
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：Prediction of tax revenue must account for earnings responses with respect to all perceived incentives, whether they are effective or not. This paper explores the extent to which tax filers respond to irrelevant incentives and develops an identification procedure for the behavioral cross-influence (BCI), a behavioral elasticity created by Farhi and Gabaix (2020) to capture such responses. Relying on French income tax returns from 2008 to 2014, the BCI is identified from earnings responses to a...
